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1.  Introduction 
   Theories have been proposed to explain why firms hold cash. A key difference 
among different theories is the prediction about whether there is an optimal level of 
corporate cash holdings. The tradeoff theory predicts that there is an optimal level of 
cash based on the tradeoff between the benefits and the costs of holding cash (e.g., 
Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999), while the financing hierarchy theory and the 
agency theory predict that there is not such an optimal level (e.g., Opler et al., 1999). 
   In this paper, we empirically test the tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings by 
examining whether there is an optimal level of cash holdings. While the tradeoff 
theory predicts that there is an optimal level of cash, the actual level of cash may not 
always stay at the optimal point. Suppose there is a deviation from the optimal level 
of cash, we expect that the deviations reduce the value of cash to shareholders. 
   We get a sample of 77999 firm-year observations from 1985 to 2005. We use a 
two-step methodology. First, we use a benchmark specification for the determinants 
of corporate cash holdings based on Opler et al. (1999). The predicted level of cash is 
regarded as the optimal level of cash. The residuals are regarded as the deviations 
from the optimum. Then we use the methodology based on Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) to examine how the deviations from the optimum affect the marginal value of 
cash to shareholders.  
   We find that the deviations from optimal cash holdings reduce the value of cash to 
shareholders. The marginal value of one dollar is $1.14 ($0.97) if a change in cash 
moves corporate cash holdings towards (away from) the optimal level. It implies that 
on average the same dollar is valued at a difference of 17 cents depending on whether 
it increases or reduces the magnitude of deviations from the optimum. We examine 
the deviations on either side of the optimal level of cash, and find that both the 
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above-optimal deviations and the below-optimal deviations reduce the marginal value 
of cash to shareholders. We find consistent results when we use different measures of 
the magnitude of deviations from the optimum. 
   We conclude that the results are consistent with the prediction of the tradeoff 
theory, and that there exists an optimal level of corporate cash holdings.  
   This paper contributes to the literature on corporate cash holdings by providing 
more explicit evidences to support the tradeoff theory. Previous papers in the literature 
argue that it is difficult to differentiate the tradeoff theory from alternative theories. 
For example, Opler et al. (1999) examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings, 
and state that “the distinction between the financing hierarchy model and the static 
tradeoff model is not as clear-cut as one might want”.1 They argue that “Even though 
we focus on an extreme version of the financing hierarchy model, some of its 
empirical predictions are similar to those of the static tradeoff model, so that it is 
difficult to distinguish empirically between the two models”.2 
Our paper differs from the papers in the literature in that we test the tradeoff 
theory by examining how the deviations from the optimum affect the value of cash. 
Since the tradeoff theory predicts that there is an optimal level of cash, we develop the 
hypothesis based on the conjecture that the deviations from the optimum reduce the 
value of cash to shareholders. This is a unique prediction of the tradeoff theory, and is 
not shared by any other theory on corporate cash holdings. Therefore, since our 
research setting is not affected by the potential confounding interpretation from the 
alternative theories, our results can provide more explicit evidences to support the 
tradeoff theory. 
 
                                                        
1
 See Opler et al. (1999), p14. 
2
 See Opler et al. (1999), p14. 
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2. Hypothesis development 
Opler et al. (1999) propose a tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings. The 
tradeoff theory argues that there is an optimal level of cash. Cash holdings are 
determined by the tradeoff between the costs and the benefits of carrying cash. The 
costs of holding cash include lower rate of returns and tax disadvantages. The benefits 
of holding cash include reducing transaction costs and retaining the ability to finance 
investment projects when external financing is too costly. Corporate cash holdings 
should be held at the point where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost of 
holding cash.   
However, the actual level of cash may not always stay at the optimal point. 
Therefore, we can decompose the actual level of cash into two parts: the optimal level 
of cash and the deviations from the optimum. This can be illustrated by Figure 1. In 
this figure, Point C indicates the value-maximizing point of cash holdings. Point A 
represents the situation of a below-optimal deviation, and Point B represents the 
situation of an above-optimal deviation. 
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Moreover, in the Figure 1, Arrow A1 and Arrow B1 indicate that a change in cash 
moves corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level. Conversely, Arrow A2 and 
Arrow B2 indicate that a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings away from 
the optimal level. We expect that shareholders place a higher (lower) value on cash if 
a change in cash moves cash holdings towards (away from) the optimal level. 
 Therefore, we have the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: The marginal value of cash is higher (lower) for shareholders when a 
change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards (away from) the optimal level. 
 
 
3.  Data and methodology 
   We describe the data and the methodology in this section. 
3.1. Data 
   We obtain the data of U.S. firms in Compustat from 1985 to 2005. We obtain 
stock return data from CRSP. We get the data of the institutional ownership from the 
Thomson Financial Institutional Ownership database. We get the segment-level data 
from the Compustat Segment database. We obtain the data of GDP from the website 
of the Federal Reserve Bank. We obtain the data of 25 Fama and French portfolios 
formed on size and book-to-market from Professor Kenneth French’s website.3 We 
exclude financial service firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999), because their 
cash holdings need to meet statutory capital requirements. We merge the data from 
these databases and exclude the firms with incomplete data. Our final sample consists 
of 10264 firms with 77999 firm-year observations. We winsorize the data to reduce 
the impact of outliers. 
                                                        
3
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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Table 1 shows the univariate statistics. We find that the mean of the ratio of cash 
to net assets (defined as total assets less cash) is 0.2271, and the median is 0.0803. It 
is consistent with the findings in Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009) that 
corporate cash holdings have an important role in a firm’s balance sheet due to its 
magnitude.  
3.2. Methodology 
   We follow Tong (2008) and use a two-step methodology.  
3.2.1. First step 
   In the first step, we design a benchmark specification for the determinants of 
corporate cash holdings based on Opler et al. (1999) as well as the papers in the more 
recent literature (e.g., Harford et al., 2012; Subramaniam et al., 2011). We estimate the 
following regression using the Fama-MacBeth method4.   
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3.2.1.1. The variables in the equation (1) 
   In this section, we describe the variables in the equation (1). 
(1) The dependent variable 
   We follow Opler et al. (1999) and use the logarithm of the ratio of Cash to Net 
Assets as the dependent variable. Cash is cash and marketable securities, and Net 
Assets is total assets less cash.  
 
                                                        
4
 The Fama-MacBeth method treats each year as an independent cross-section and mitigates the 
problem of serial correlation in the residuals of a time-series cross-sectional regression. See Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) for more details. 
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(2) Size 
   Size is the logarithm of net assets. Miller and Orr (1966) suggest that there are 
economies of scale in cash management. The tradeoff theory predicts that firm size 
has a negative impact on cash holdings because of the economies of scale.  
(3) Market-to-book ratio 
   M/B is the market-to-book ratio. It is calculated as the market value of equity plus 
the book value of net assets minus the book value of common equity, divided by net 
assets. Opler et al. (1999) state that “The market-to-book ratio is often used as a proxy 
for investment opportunities”.5 The tradeoff theory predicts that a firm with higher 
investment opportunities holds more cash because the firm will have to give up better 
projects if faced with a cash shortage.  
(4) Cash flow 
   Cash flow is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to net assets. The 
tradeoff theory predicts that firms with higher cash flow can afford to keep lower 
levels of cash because higher cash flow can better meet a firm’s demand for liquidity.  
(5) Net working capital  
   Net Working Capital is working capital less cash, divided by net assets. Opler et al. 
(1999) argue that a firm may hold alternative liquid assets besides cash, and use the 
net working capital as a measure of liquid asset substitutes. 
(6) Capital expenditures 
   Capital Expenditures are the ratio of capital expenditures to net assets. The 
tradeoff theory predicts that firms with more capital expenditures hold more cash 
because a firm has more demand for the liquidity.  
 
                                                        
5
 See Opler et al. (1999), p11-p12.  
                                                          
7
(7) R&D 
   R&D is the ratio of research and development expenses to net assets. The same 
argument for the capital expenditures applies to the R&D. 
(8) Leverage 
   Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to net assets. The tradeoff theory predicts 
that firms with higher leverage have more cash because there is higher agency cost of 
debt associated with higher leverage.  
(9) Industry sigma 
   Industry sigma is a measure of the industry volatility, and is defined as the mean 
of standard deviations of cash flow over assets over the previous 5 years for the firms 
in the same industry as defined by 2-digit SIC code. The tradeoff theory predicts that 
the firms in an industry with greater volatility hold more cash because the uncertainty 
may lead to the situations in which firms have more outlays than expected.  
(10) Dividend dummy 
 
   Dividend dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm pays dividends, and 
equals 0 otherwise. The tradeoff theory predicts that firms have more cash if they pay 
dividends because a firm that currently pays dividends can reduce its dividend 
payments and converted them into cash at low cost.  
(11) Regulation dummy 
   Regulation dummy is dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is in a regulated 
industry, and equals 0 otherwise. This controls for the potential effects of regulation. 
(12) Institutional ownership    
 
   Institutional Ownership is the ratio of the shares owned by institutional investors 
to the total shares outstanding. Harford et al. (2012) find that firms with weaker 
corporate governance structures have smaller cash reserves. We use institutional 
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ownership as a measure of corporate governance.6 A higher level of institutional 
ownership indicates better corporate governance.  
(13) Firm diversification dummy 
   Firm Diversification Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has at 
least two segments with different 2-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise. Opler et al. 
(1999) argue that the tradeoff theory predicts that diversified firms have less cash than 
specialized firms because diversified firms are more likely than specialized firms to 
have substantial assets that can be sold. Subramaniam et al. (2011) find that 
diversified firms hold less cash than focused firms.  
(14) Log (GDP) 
    Log(GDP) is the logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product at the quarter 
immediately before a firm’s fiscal-year-end month. We use this variable as a measure 
of the economic environmental conditions.  
3.2.1.2. The variable Towards Optimum 
   In the equation (1), the predicted level of cash is regarded as the optimal level of 
cash. The residuals are regarded as the deviations from the optimum, because the 
residuals are not explained by the determinants of corporate cash holdings. We 
construct a dummy variable called Towards Optimum. This is a measure that indicates 
whether or not a change in cash will move corporate cash holdings towards the 
optimum.  
    
 
 
                                                        
6
 Harford et al. (2012) also use other measures of corporate governance, such as the Gindex developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003), board characteristics, and so on. However, these measures are only available 
for a sub-sample of the firms (mostly larger firms). Since we need to estimate a benchmark model for 
the entire sample, we use institutional ownership as a measure of corporate governance.   
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   The variable Towards Optimum is defined as follows. 
 
If either Conditions A or Conditions B is met, Towards Optimum = 1. 
   
   Conditions A:   (1) Casht-1 < Optimal Casht-1 
                 (2) Casht > Casht-1 
                 (3) |Casht – Casht-1| < 2 * | Optimal Casht-1– Casht-1| 
   Conditions B:   (1) Casht-1 > Optimal Casht-1 
                 (2) Casht < Casht-1 
                 (3) |Casht – Casht-1| < 2 * |Optimal Casht-1– Casht-1| 
 
Otherwise, Towards Optimum = 0. 
 
 
   Conditions A include three conditions. First, a firm’s actual level of cash at year 
t-1 is below the optimal level of cash at year t-1 (i.e., below-optimal deviations). 
Second, the firm’s cash at year t is greater than its cash at year t-1 (i.e., an increase in 
cash holdings). Third, the absolute value of the change in cash from year t-1 to t is 
less than twice of the difference between a firm’s actual level of cash and optimal 
level of cash at year t-1. If these three conditions are met, then the change in cash 
from year t-1 to year t moves corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level. Here, 
the third condition means that an increase in cash is not too large to ensure that the 
increase in cash will reduce the difference between a firm’s actual level of cash and 
the optimum.  
Similarly, Conditions B include three conditions. First, a firm’s actual level of 
cash at year t-1 is above the optimal level of cash at year t-1 (i.e., above-optimal 
deviations). Second, the firm’s cash at year t is less than its cash at year t-1 (i.e., an 
decrease in cash holdings). Third, the absolute value of the change in cash from year 
t-1 to t is less than twice of the difference between a firm’s actual level of cash and 
optimal level of cash at year t-1. If these three conditions are met, then the change in 
cash from year t-1 to year t moves corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level. 
   If neither Conditions A nor Conditions B is met, then the change in cash from year 
t-1 to year t moves corporate cash holdings away from the optimal level. 
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3.2.2. Second step 
   In the second step, we study how a change in cash affects shareholder value 
depending on whether or not the change in cash moves corporate cash holdings 
towards the optimum. This model is based on a benchmark model proposed by 
Faulkender and Wang (2006). The methodology in Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
essentially represents a long-run event study. The event is the unexpected change in 
cash holdings, while the event window is defined as the whole fiscal year. 
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   We describe the variables in the equation (2) as follows. 
(1) The dependent variable 
   The dependent variable is excess stock return. It is calculated as the stock return 
of firm i during a fiscal year t (Ri,t) minus its benchmark return over the same period 
(RBi,t). The benchmark portfolio is one of the 25 Fama and French portfolios formed 
on size and book-to-market.7 
(2) The unexpected change in cash holdings:  ∆Cash 
We follow the methodology in Faulkender and Wang (2006) and first define the 
                                                        
7
 For each firm-year observation, a firm is grouped into one of the 25 Fama and French portfolios 
based on the intersection between size and book-to-market. The return of the corresponding Fama and 
French portfolio is regarded as the benchmark return for the firm during that year. See Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) for more details. 
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unexpected change in cash holdings as the realized change in cash holdings. Then we 
use an alternative measure based on the net change in cash holdings in the later 
analysis. We measure the change in cash holdings as the ratio of the change in cash 
and marketable securities over a fiscal year to the 1-year lagged market value of 
equity.  
(3) The interaction item: Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 
We construct an interaction term, Towards Optimum * ∆Cash. The variable 
Towards Optimum is obtained from the first step.  According to the Hypothesis 1, 
we expect that the coefficient of this interaction term is positive, which indicates that 
the marginal value of cash is higher if a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings 
towards the optimal level. 
(4) Control variables 
   We follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and include the following control 
variables. The first group of variables control for the firm-specific factors that might 
be correlated with the unexpected change in cash holdings. These variables include 
the change in the interest expenses (∆Interest Expenses), the change in dividends 
(∆Dividends), the lagged cash holdings (Casht-1), the leverage (Leverage), and a 
firm’s net financing defined as equity issued minus repurchases plus debt issued 
minus debt retired (Net Financing).  
   The second group of variables control for the change in profitability and corporate 
investment policies. These variables include the change in earnings (∆Earnings), the 
change in a firm’s investment policies measured by the change in net assets (∆Net 
Assets) and the change in the R&D (∆R&D). 
   The third group of variables control for other sources that can affect the marginal 
value of cash. These variables are two interaction items developed by Faulkender and 
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Wang (2006): Leverage * ∆Cash and Casht-1 * ∆Cash. Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
argue that an extra dollar of cash holdings is less valuable for shareholders in highly 
levered firms than in firms with low leverage, and that the marginal value of cash is 
decreasing in the level of the firm’s cash position.8 
3.2.3. About the joint-test argument 
   We follow Tong (2008) and rely on a joint-test argument to validate the results. 
Suppose the first-step specification does not provide a proper description of the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings, it is more likely that the residuals are just 
noises so that they will not have a systematic relation with shareholder value as 
predicted by the tradeoff theory in the second-step analysis. However, suppose we do 
find that a change in cash is valued higher by shareholders if it moves corporate cash 
holdings towards the optimum, then this can in turn imply that the first-step 
specification gives a reasonable description of the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings and support the predictions of the tradeoff theory. 
 
 
4. Results 
   We report the results in this section. 
4.1. Determinants of corporate cash holdings 
   Table 2 shows the Fama-MacBeth model on the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. We report the p-value calculated based on the Newey-West adjustment for 
standard errors. We find that cash increases with a firm’s market-to-book ratio, 
earnings, capital expenditures, industry sigma, R&D, institutional ownership, and the 
logarithm of GDP. We find that cash decreases with a firm’s size, net working capital, 
                                                        
8
 See Faulkender and Wang (2006), p1963-p1964 and p1968. 
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leverage, dividend dummy, regulation dummy, rating dummy, and firm diversification 
dummy. The signs of the coefficients are consistent with the findings in the literature. 
We construct the dummy variable Towards Optimum based on the estimates in this 
model. 
4.2. Deviations from the optimum and the value of cash 
Table 3 shows how the deviations from the optimum affect the value of cash to 
shareholders. We report the p-value calculated based on the robust standard errors 
clustered by firm (e.g., Petersen, 2009). We examine the marginal value of cash 
holdings in the entire sample, and report the results in the first column. In this 
regression, an extra dollar in cash affects a firm’s excess return through the item 
∆Cash and the interaction terms (Casht-1 * ∆Cash and Leverage * ∆Cash). The 
calculation is as follows: The mean firm has a lag of cash holdings equivalent to 
15.13% of the market capitalization of equity, and the mean leverage ratio, defined as 
the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets, is 
23.09%. Therefore, the marginal value of one dollar to shareholders in the mean firm 
is $1.00 (= 1.392 + (–1.348 * 15.13%) + (–0.809 ∗ 23.09%)).  
   In the second column of Table 3, we report the results about the impact of a 
change in the deviations of a firm’s cash from the optimum on shareholder value. This 
regression follows the specification as indicated in the equation (2). To calculate the 
marginal value of cash holdings for shareholders when a change in cash moves 
corporate cash holdings away from the optimum, we use the coefficients of the same 
three items as before (∆Cash, Casht-1 * ∆Cash, and Leverage * ∆Cash). We find that 
the marginal value of one dollar to shareholders is $0.97 when a change in cash 
moves corporate cash holdings away from the optimum. To calculate the marginal 
value of cash holdings for shareholders when a change in cash moves corporate cash 
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holdings towards the optimum, we use an additional coefficient of the interaction term, 
Towards Optimum
 
* ∆Cash. Therefore, the marginal value of one dollar to 
shareholders when a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards the 
optimum is $1.14 (= 1.369 + 0.167 + (–1.388 * 15.13%) + (–0.804 ∗ 23.09%)).  
   These results indicate that there is a significant difference in the marginal value of 
cash for shareholders depending on how a change in cash affects the deviations from 
the optimal level. An extra dollar is valued 17 cents more (p-value = 0.01) by 
shareholders when a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards the 
optimum. Therefore, the results in Table 3 are consistent with the Hypothesis 1. 
4.3. Alternative measure of the unexpected change in cash 
We follow Faulkender and Wang (2006) and repeat our analysis using the net 
change in cash holdings as an alternative measure of the unexpected change in cash. It 
is defined as the realized change in cash holdings minus the average change in cash 
holdings in the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same period.  
Table 4 shows the results. The first column demonstrates the regression for the 
entire sample. We find that the marginal value of one dollar to shareholders in the 
mean firm is $1.00. The second column shows the regression when we include the 
interaction term Towards Optimum
 
* ∆Net Cash. We find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is 0.179 (p-value = 0.01), implying that the marginal value of cash is 
higher when a change in a firm’s cash moves corporate cash holdings towards the 
optimal level. We therefore find similar results when we use the net change in cash. 
4.4. Both sides of deviations and the value of cash 
   We investigate how the deviations on both sides of the optimum affect the value 
of cash to shareholders. We use a triple interaction term, Towards Optimum
 
* ∆Cash  
* Abovet-1, to conduct the analysis. Abovet-1 is dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
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firm’s cash is above the optimal level at year t-1, and equals 0 otherwise.  
   Table 5 presents the results. The first column shows the regression when we use 
∆Cash as the measure of the unexpected change in cash. When a change in cash 
moves corporate cash holdings away from the optimal level, an extra dollar is worth 
$0.98 for shareholders. When a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings 
towards the optimal level if a firm’s cash has been below (above) the optimal level, an 
extra dollar is worth $1.21 ($1.08) to shareholders.  
   We conduct an F-test on the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash and Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1 is zero. This is 
to examine whether there is a significant difference in the value of cash between a 
change in cash that moves corporate cash holdings away from the optimum and a 
change in cash that moves corporate cash holdings towards the optimum when a 
firm’s cash has been above the optimal level. We find that the difference is significant 
(p-value = 0.01).  
   The second column shows the regression when we use ∆Net Cash as the measure 
of the unexpected change in cash. We find that when a change in cash moves 
corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level if a firm’s cash has been below 
(above) the optimal level, an extra dollar is worth $1.19 ($1.11) for shareholders. 
Therefore, we find consistent results.9  
 The results in Table 5 support the interpretation that the marginal value of cash is 
higher for shareholders in the situation when a change in cash moves corporate cash 
holdings towards the optimal level, no matter a firm’s cash has been above or below 
the optimum, than the situation when a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings 
                                                        
9
 In the second column of Table 5, the coefficient of the triple interaction term Towards Optimum * 
∆Net Cash * Abovet-1 is insignificant. It implies that if a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings 
towards the optimum, there is not a significant difference in the marginal value of cash between the 
situation of above-optimal deviation and the situation of the below-optimal deviation.  
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away from the optimal level. The findings are consistent with the Hypothesis 1. 
4.5. The magnitude of deviations and the value of cash 
   We examine the magnitude of deviations and the value of cash in this section.    
First, we construct two dummy variables called Larger Step Towards Optimum and 
Smaller Step Towards Optimum. The variable Larger (Smaller) Step Towards 
Optimum equals 1 if the magnitude of the change in cash towards the optimum is 
above (below) the median and equals 0 otherwise. Then we construct two triple 
interaction terms: Towards Optimum * Larger Step Towards Optimum * ∆Cash and 
Towards Optimum * Smaller Step Towards Optimum * ∆Cash.  
   The first column of Table 6 shows the results. We find that the coefficients of the 
two triple interaction term are 0.197 (p-value = 0.01) and 0.116 (p-value = 0.03), 
indicating that the marginal value of cash is higher if a change in cash moves 
corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level either in a larger magnitude or in a 
smaller magnitude. Moreover, we find that the marginal value of cash is higher in the 
situation of a larger step towards the optimum ($1.17) than in the situation of a 
smaller step towards the optimum ($1.09). 
Second, we define a dummy variable called After Adjustment Close To Optimum. 
The variable equals 1 if a firm’s cash is at most 10% away from the optimum after the 
change and equals 0 otherwise.10  Then we construct a triple interaction term: 
Towards Optimum * After Adjustment Close To Optimum * ∆Cash.  
The second column of Table 6 shows the results. We find that the coefficient on 
this triple interaction term is positive and significant, indicating that the marginal 
value of cash is higher ($1.66) if a firm’s cash is close to the optimum after the 
change.  
                                                        
10
 We conduct the robustness check by using different cutoff points, and find similar results. 
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Third, we use a continuous variable to replace the Towards Optimum dummy 
variable. The continuous variable is called Disequilibrium Reduction, and is defined 
as the reduction in the magnitude of deviations from the optimum. The calculation of 
the variable follows the similar rationale as the calculation for the Towards Optimum 
dummy variable as discussed in the Methodology section, but now we obtain the 
magnitude of the reduction in the deviations instead of just identifying the direction of 
the change in cash. The variable Disequilibrium Reduction is positive (negative) if a 
change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards (away from) the optimum. We 
construct an interaction term: Disequilibrium Reduction * ∆Cash. 
The third column of Table 6 shows the results. We find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is 0.571 (p-value = 0.01), indicating that the marginal value of cash is 
higher if a change in cash reduces the magnitude of deviations and moves corporate 
cash holdings towards the optimal level. An extra dollar is on average worth $1.14 
($0.98) for the situation of a positive (negative) Disequilibrium Reduction. 
Therefore, we find consistent results when we use different measures of the 
magnitude of deviations from the optimum. The results in Table 6 support the 
Hypothesis 1. 
4.6. Sample period 
   We conduct the robustness check on the sample period. Our sample period is 21 
years and the ideas about the optimal level of cash may evolve over time. Therefore, 
we divide the sample into two periods and conduct the robustness checks. One period 
is from 1985 to 1995, and the other period is from 1996 to 2005. We estimate the 
benchmark specification for the determinants of cash holdings separately for the two 
sample periods (not reported for the brevity), and then examine the value of cash in 
the two sample periods.  
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   Table 7 shows the results. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash is 0.180 (p-value = 0.01) for the sample period from 1985 
to 1995, and is 0.182 (p-value = 0.01) for the sample period from 1996 to 2005. 
Therefore, we find similar results after we divide the sample into two periods. 
4.7. Alternative measure of the dependent variable 
We conduct the robustness check on the dependent variable. We construct an 
alternative measure of the dependent variable based on the Tobin’s Q which is a 
classical measure of valuation. The variable is called Excess Change in Tobin’s Q. We 
construct this variable by using the similar methodology as the one used for 
calculating the Excess Return. It can be expressed by the following equation. 
 
Excess Change in Tobin’s Q = Change in Tobin’s Q – Benchmark Change in Tobin’s Q     (3) 
 
We first calculate the change in a firm’s Tobin’s Q from t-1 to t. Then we 
calculate a benchmark change in Tobin’s Q over the same period, calculated as the 
weighted average (weighted by firm size) of the change in Tobin’s Q in one of the 25 
Fama and French portfolios that the firm belongs to. The Excess Change in Tobin’s Q 
is the difference between the change in a firm’s Tobin’s Q and the benchmark change 
in Tobin’s Q.  
Table 8 shows the results. The dependent variable is the Excess Change in 
Tobin’s Q. The first column shows that the coefficient of the interaction term Towards 
Optimum * ∆Cash is 0.119 (p-value = 0.02). It implies that a change in cash have an 
additional positive impact on Tobin’s Q if the change in cash moves corporate cash 
holdings towards the optimum. We examine the impact of the deviations on both sides 
in the second column. The second column shows that the coefficient of the interaction 
term Towards Optimum * ∆Cash is 0.131 (p-value = 0.05), and that the coefficient of 
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the triple interaction term Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1 is -0.043 (p-value = 
0.79). We conduct an F-test on the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash and Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1 is zero, and it 
rejects the null hypothesis (p-value = 0.07). The results are consistent with the 
interpretation that a change in cash has an additional positive impact on Tobin’s Q in 
the situation when a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards the 
optimal level, no matter a firm’s cash has been above or below the optimum. 
Therefore, we find similar results when we use an alternative measure of the 
dependent variable.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
   The tradeoff theory of corporate cash holdings predicts that there is an optimal 
level of corporate cash holdings. In this paper, we test the tradeoff theory by studying 
the relation between the deviations from optimal cash holdings and the valuation of 
cash from a shareholder’s perspective. We use a two-step methodology. In the first 
step, we decompose corporate cash holdings into the optimal level of cash and the 
deviations from the optimal level. In the second step, we examine the value of cash 
for shareholders depending on how a change in cash affects the deviations from the 
optimal level. We find that the marginal value of cash for shareholders is higher when 
a change in cash moves corporate cash holdings towards the optimal level. Moreover, 
we find that the value of cash for shareholders is higher when a change in cash 
reduces the magnitude of either above-optimal deviations or below-optimal deviations. 
We conduct the robustness checks on the sample period and the dependent variable, 
and find similar results.  
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   We conclude that the results are consistent with the interpretation that there is an 
optimal level of corporate cash holdings, and that they support the tradeoff theory of 
corporate cash holdings.  
   From a practitioner’s perspective, the findings in our paper can be beneficial for 
companies to better achieve the target of shareholder value maximization. Since our 
results support the tradeoff theory, it implies that a company can increase shareholder 
value by adjusting its corporate cash holdings towards the optimum. Suppose a firm 
has too few cash holdings, the firm can increase shareholder value by increasing its 
cash holdings towards the optimum. Suppose a firm has too many cash holdings, the 
firm can increase shareholder value by reducing its cash holdings towards the 
optimum. 
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Table 1 
Univariate Statistics 
 
This table reports univariate statistics. The sample consists of 77999 firm-year observations from 1985 
to 2005. Cash is defined as cash and marketable securities divided by net assets, where net assets are 
total assets less cash. Size is defined as the logarithm of net assets. M/B is defined as the market value 
of equity plus the book value of net assets minus the book value of common equity, divided by net 
assets. Cash Flow is defined as the ratio of income before extraordinary items to net assets. Capital 
Expenditures is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to net assets. R&D is defined as the ratio of 
research and development expenses to net assets. Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to 
net assets. Dividends is defined as the ratio of common dividend to net assets. Net Working Capital is 
defined as working capital less cash, divided by net assets. Industry Sigma is the mean of standard 
deviations of cash flow over assets over the previous 5 years for the firms in the same industry as 
defined by 2-digit SIC code. Rating Dummy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm’s credit rating 
is at investment grades, and equals 0 otherwise. Institutional Ownership is the ratio of the shares owned 
by institutional investors to the total shares outstanding. Firm Diversification Dummy is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a firm has at least two segments with different 2-digit SIC codes, and 0 
otherwise. GDP is the Gross Domestic Product at the quarter immediately before a firm’s 
fiscal-year-end month.  
 
 Mean Median 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Std. Dev. 
Cash 0.2271 0.0803 0.0204 0.2925 0.3077 
Size 18.6904 18.5501 17.0280 20.2707 2.3523 
M / B 2.2663 1.4150 1.0646 2.3319 4.1265 
Cash Flow -0.0239 0.0329 -0.0450 0.0800 0.1939 
Capital Expenditures 0.0764 0.0534 0.0269 0.0968 0.0767 
R&D 0.0684 0.0000 0.0000 0.0642 0.1375 
Leverage 0.1905 0.1473 0.0103 0.3073 0.1927 
Dividends 0.0091 0.0000 0.0000 0.0111 0.0194 
Net Working Capital 0.0711 0.0852 -0.0512 0.2596 0.2837 
Industry Sigma 0.1039 0.0887 0.0551 0.1278 0.0746 
Rating Dummy 0.0665 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2492 
Institutional Ownership 0.2888 0.1970 0.0000 0.5197 0.2952 
Firm Diversification Dummy 0.2949 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4560 
GDP 8615.07 8402.00 6380.80 10644.30 2494.13 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
This table reports the determinants of cash holdings using the Fama-MacBeth model over the period 
1985 to 2005. The definition of all the variables can be found in the text and in the heading of Table 1. 
We report the p-value calculated based on the Newey-West adjustment for standard errors in the 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 Log (Cash) 
Intercept -18.279* 
 (0.06) 
Size -0.085*** 
 (0.01) 
M/B 0.217*** 
 (0.01) 
Cash Flow 1.128*** 
 (0.01) 
Capital Expenditures 0.799*** 
 (0.01) 
R&D 2.571*** 
 (0.01) 
Leverage -1.027*** 
 (0.01) 
Net Working Capital -0.021 
 (0.70) 
Industry Sigma 2.165*** 
 (0.01) 
Dividend Dummy -0.160*** 
 (0.01) 
Regulation Dummy -0.163*** 
 (0.01) 
Rating Dummy -0.210*** 
 (0.01) 
Institutional Ownership 0.284*** 
 (0.01) 
Firm Diversification Dummy -0.050** 
 (0.05) 
Log(GDP) 1.767* 
 (0.08) 
Observations 21 
Adjusted R-squared 0.35 
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Table 3 
Deviations and the Value of Cash 
 
This table reports the relation between the deviations from optimal corporate cash holdings and the 
value of cash from a shareholder’s perspective. The dependent variable is Excess Return defined as Ri,t 
– RBi,t. All variables except Excess Return, Towards Optimum, and Leverage are standardized by the 
lagged market value of equity. Cash is cash plus marketable securities. ∆Cash is the one-year change of 
cash holdings (Casht – Casht-1). Towards Optimum is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the change in a 
firm’s cash holdings reduces the difference between the actual level of cash and the predicted level of 
cash, and equals 0 otherwise. ∆Earnings is the one-year change of earnings before extraordinary items. 
∆Net Assets is the one-year change of total assets minus cash holdings. ∆R&D is the one-year change 
of research and development expenses. ∆Interest Expenses is the one-year change of interest expenses. 
∆Dividends is the one-year change of common dividends. Leverage is the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Net Financing is net new equity issues plus net new debt issues. We report the p-value calculated based 
on the robust standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 Excess Return 
Intercept 0.009** 0.010** 
  (0.04) (0.03) 
∆Cash  1.392*** 1.369*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash  0.167*** 
  (0.01) 
∆Earnings 0.701*** 0.698*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets 0.313*** 0.315*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D 0.744*** 0.747*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Interest Expenses -1.507*** -1.509*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 2.767*** 2.767*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.270*** 0.276*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.268*** -0.270*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Cash -1.348*** -1.388*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Cash -0.809*** -0.804*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.128*** 0.128*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 77999 77999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.12 
 
 
       The following table shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in the 
regressions.  
 
The marginal value of $1 
Entire sample 
 
$1.00 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 
 
$1.14 
 
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.97 
 
 
                                                          
25
Table 4 
Alternative Measure of Unexpected Change in Cash 
 
This table reports the relation between the deviations from optimal corporate cash holdings and the 
value of cash from a shareholder’s perspective using an alternative measure of the unexpected change 
in cash. ∆Net Cash is the realized change in cash holdings minus the average change in cash holdings in 
the corresponding benchmark portfolio over the same period. The definition of all other variables can be 
found in the text and in the heading of Table 3. We report the p-value calculated based on the robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. 
 
 
 Excess Return 
Intercept 0.026*** 0.027*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Cash  1.390*** 1.364*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Net Cash  0.179*** 
  (0.01) 
∆Earnings 0.702*** 0.699*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets 0.314*** 0.317*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D 0.740*** 0.743*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Interest Expenses -1.519*** -1.520*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 2.761*** 2.765*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.258*** 0.264*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.271*** -0.273*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Net Cash -1.338*** -1.380*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Net Cash -0.814*** -0.806*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.121*** 0.120*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 77999 77999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.12 
 
 
    The following table shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in the 
regressions.  
 
The marginal value of $1 
Entire sample 
 
$1.00 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 
 
$1.15 
 
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.97 
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 Table 5 
Deviations on Both Sides and the Value of Cash 
 
This table reports the relation between the deviations on both sides of optimal corporate cash holdings 
and the value of cash from a shareholder’s perspective. Above is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
actual level of cash is above the predicted level of cash, and equals 0 otherwise. The definition of all 
other variables can be found in the text and in the headings of Table 3 and Table 4. F-test refers to an 
F-test on the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of Towards Optimum * ∆Cash (∆Net Cash) 
and Towards Optimum * ∆Cash (∆Net Cash) * Abovet-1 is zero. We report the p-value calculated based 
on the robust standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 Excess Return 
Intercept 0.008* 0.025*** 
  (0.08) (0.01) 
∆Cash  1.381***  
 (0.01)  
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 0.222***  
 (0.01)  
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1 -0.126***  
 (0.01)  
∆Net Cash   1.374*** 
 
 (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Net Cash  0.207** 
 
 (0.05) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Net Cash * Abovet-1  -0.079 
 
 (0.50) 
∆Earnings 0.700*** 0.701*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets 0.316*** 0.317*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D 0.739*** 0.739*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Interest Expenses -1.504*** -1.518*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 2.766*** 2.759*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.288*** 0.271*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.267*** -0.272*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Cash -1.400***  
 (0.01)  
Leverage * ∆Cash -0.795***  
 (0.01)  
Casht-1* ∆Net Cash  -1.363*** 
  (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Net Cash  -0.803*** 
  (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.126*** 0.120*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
F-test (p-value) 0.01 0.01 
Observations 77999 77999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.12 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
    The following tables show the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in the 
regressions.  
 
The marginal value of $1  
(∆Cash) 
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.98 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Abovet-1 = 0 
 
$1.21 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Abovet-1 = 1 
 
$1.08 
 
 
 
The marginal value of $1  
(∆Net Cash) 
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.98 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Abovet-1 = 0 
 
$1.19 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Abovet-1 = 1 
 
$1.11 
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Table 6 
The Magnitude of Deviations and the Value of Cash 
 
This table reports the relation between the magnitude of deviations and the value of cash from a shareholder’s perspective. 
Larger (Smaller) Step Towards Optimum is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the magnitude of the change in cash towards the 
optimum is above (below) the median, and equals 0 otherwise. After Adjustment Close To Optimum is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a firm’s cash is at most 10% away from the optimum after the change, and equals 0 otherwise. Disequilibrium 
Reduction is a continuous variable defined as the reduction in the magnitude of deviations from the optimum. The definition of 
all other variables can be found in the text and in the heading of Table 3. We report the p-value calculated based on the robust 
standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
  Excess Return  
Intercept 0.010** 0.010** 0.019*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
∆Cash  1.369*** 1.374*** 1.517*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash  0.095***  
 
 (0.01)  
Towards Optimum * Larger Step Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 0.197***   
 (0.01)   
Towards Optimum * Smaller Step Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 0.116**   
 (0.03)   
Towards Optimum * After Adjustment Close To Optimum   0.580***  
 
 (0.01)  
Disequilibrium Reduction * ∆Cash   0.571*** 
 
  (0.01) 
∆Earnings 0.698*** 0.700*** 0.757*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets 0.315*** 0.315*** 0.309*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D 0.745*** 0.744*** 0.784*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Interest Expenses -1.508*** -1.508*** -1.571*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 2.765*** 2.767*** 2.682*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.302*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.279*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Cash -1.388*** -1.380*** -1.567*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Cash -0.802*** -0.802*** -0.966*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.177*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 77999 77999 77999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
The following tables show the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in the 
regressions.  
 
 
The marginal value of $1  
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.97 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Larger Step towards Optimum = 1 
 
$1.17 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and Smaller Step towards Optimum = 1 
 
$1.09 
 
 
 
The marginal value of $1  
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.98 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and After Adjustment Close to Optimum = 1 
 
$1.66 
 
Towards Optimum = 1 and After Adjustment Close to Optimum = 0 
 
$1.08 
 
 
 
The marginal value of $1  
Disequilibrium Reduction > 0 
 
$1.14 
 
Disequilibrium Reduction < 0 
 
$0.98 
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Table 7 
Robustness Check: Sample Period 
 
This table reports the robustness check. Column 1 shows the regression for the sample period from 
1985 to 1995. Column 2 shows the regression for the sample period from 1996 to 2005. The definition 
of all the variables can be found in the text and in the heading of Table 3. We report the p-value 
calculated based on the robust standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 Excess Return 
 
Sample Period 
1985 – 1995  
Sample Period  
1996 – 2005 
Intercept 0.018*** -0.005 
  (0.01) (0.32) 
∆Cash  1.017*** 1.335*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 0.180*** 0.182*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Earnings 0.646*** 0.730*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets 0.323*** 0.306*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D 0.905*** 0.938*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Interest Expenses -1.441*** -1.546*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 2.696*** 2.727*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.188*** 0.295*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage -0.237*** -0.254*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Cash -0.156** -1.479*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Cash -0.237** -0.583*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.122*** 0.065*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 35194 42805 
Adjusted R-squared 0.12 0.13 
 
The following table shows the marginal value of $1 calculated based on the estimates in the 
regressions. 
 
The marginal value of $1 
 
Sample Period 
1985 – 1995 
Sample Period  
1996 – 2005 
Towards Optimum = 1 
 
$1.11 
 
$1.16 
 
Towards Optimum = 0 
 
$0.94 
 
$0.98 
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Table 8 
Robustness Check: Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variable 
 
This table reports the robustness check. The dependent variable is Excess Change in Tobin’s Q, which 
is the difference between the change in a firm’s Tobin’s Q and the benchmark change in Tobin’s Q (see 
text for more details). The definition of all other variables can be found in the text and in the heading of 
Table 3. F-test refers to an F-test on the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of Towards 
Optimum * ∆Cash and Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1 is zero. We report the p-value calculated 
based on the robust standard errors clustered by firm in the parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
 
 Excess Change in Tobin’s Q 
Intercept -0.376*** -0.377*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Cash  0.332*** 0.332*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash 0.119** 0.131** 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Towards Optimum * ∆Cash * Abovet-1  -0.043 
  (0.79) 
∆Earnings 0.400*** 0.400*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Net Assets -0.154*** -0.154*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆R&D -0.331** -0.331** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
∆Interest Expenses -0.454*** -0.454*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
∆Dividends 3.956*** 3.957*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1 0.841*** 0.840*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage 0.314*** 0.314*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Casht-1* ∆Cash -0.296*** -0.297*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Leverage * ∆Cash -0.349*** -0.349*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Net Financing 0.002 0.002 
 (0.94) (0.94) 
F-test (p-value)  0.07 
Observations 77999 77999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 
 
 
  
